The sunlight of hope, pale at first, but getting stronger through the day, shining once again on a country with the opportunity to get its future back.” These were the words of the newly elected Prime Minister Keir Starmer on 5 July, drawing 14 years of Conservative Party rule to a much-anticipated close. During this period, Britain experienced Brexit, five prime ministers, as well as extraordinary economic instability and decline. The term “middling power” gained traction among observers inside and out, evoking a crisis of identity over the UK’s global status and relations.
Looking back a few months earlier to the start of 2024, the domestic political landscapes in the UK and Taiwan bore certain similarities. Both countries faced discontent caused by rising housing and energy prices, high youth unemployment, and public dissatisfaction with the incumbent parties. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost their legislative majority, Labour was empowered with a landslide. Today, both administrations are embroiled in several pressing domestic matters.
In the UK, Chancellor Rachel Reeves’ inaugural speech prioritized reform to the planning system, a topic that might strike viewers overseas as irrelevant, even tedious. Yet this speech, as well as an address given by Reeves at the Peterson Institute months prior in November 2023, may offer clues as to how the freshly formed Cabinet conceptualizes its foreign policy: through domestic reform. Reeves stressed bolstering resilience and economic prosperity at home as the foundations for greater international cooperation with like-minded allies, what she termed “Securonomics.”
The theme of reform from the bottom up defining the Party’s global approach echoed in Home Secretary Yvette Cooper’s speech at RUSI a year ago. Discussing the potential of generative artificial intelligence (AI) to exacerbate extremist thought, Cooper emphasized the urgent need for the government to recognize the blurred boundaries between domestic and international security threats. Greater exchange cooperation between the Home Office and Foreign Office was suggested as an institutional antidote to oversights, which left the UK more vulnerable to external security threats, including those from Russia and China. It is also widely suspected the cyberattacks on the Ministry of Defence in May and on the NHS in June were conducted by Chinese state-sponsored agents. Labour unveiled the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill in the King’s speech to protect critical infrastructure. The new legislation will give greater power to regulators to ensure companies report cyber security attacks and meet standards in cyber security defense.
Labour’s greater focus on security, if we understand “security” in a broader sense, may present a pathway for cooperation and mutual understanding between the governments of the UK and Taiwan. As a nation that has long been at the battlefront against China’s united front work and disinformation campaigns, Taiwan understands all too well the inseparability of international security from the nuts and bolts of domestic reform.
Furthermore, Taiwan’s resistance to such activities has been facilitated by technical innovations which engineer generative AI and machine learning to reinforce public trust in democratic systems. Take, for example the fact-checking generative AI utilized by the Co-Facts chatbot to assess the quality of online information, or the consensus-mining software Pol.is deployed to amend policy. Taiwan is also a pioneer in developing cyber security systems and training state officials to protect key infrastructure against Chinese cyberattacks. These experiences and insights may well resonate with Starmer and his cabinet’s central concerns since assuming office: to restore trust in politics and tighten security.
In terms of foreign policy, Labour is evidently prioritizing rebuilding relations with the European Union (EU). As Foreign Secretary David Lammy conducts his “Operation Reset” tour of European countries, it appears Asia and the Indo-Pacific have been relegated to a secondary status for the time being. However, the EU’s deepening political and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific over recent years may indicate Britain’s future direction of policy toward the region under Labour. Based on numerous elite interviews with EU representatives, findings from a recent study suggest the bloc has evolved from its previous “third way” approach to align more closely with the US, Australia, and Japan. The war on Ukraine has also spurred security cooperation among EU states to address the issue of China. Under Starmer, Britain is poised to align its security strategy in step with Europe, illustrated by the much-discussed EU-UK Security Pact.
Labour is also keen to reinvigorate Britain’s “special relationship” with the US, at least in part through a commitment to AUKUS, which the party manifesto explicitly mentioned. A few months ago, the US suggested an AUKUS submarine project could be used as a further deterrent against a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The UK’s deepening involvement in the trilateral security pact would, therefore, likely stretch to cross-Strait relations.
As for the UK’s economic relations with Taiwan, President Lai expressed hope that Britain would support Taiwan’s application to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). However, given Labour’s focus on repairing the country’s relationships with the EU and the US, it seems unlikely the UK will be an active frontline advocate for Taiwan’s membership. In this respect, there is likely to be little deviation compared to the previous Conservative government.
However, on a more personal level, the fact that Starmer visited Taiwan in 2016 and 2018 may add an interesting dimension to UK-Taiwan relations. During both visits and in his capacity as a board member of the Death Penalty Project, Starmer campaigned for the abolition of the death penalty, which culminated in a co-authored opinion piece for the Taipei Times. Despite Starmer’s expression of disappointment over the execution of Lee Hung-chi, the future PM praised Taiwan’s progress on other human rights matters, mainly the incorporation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into domestic law.
One could draw two inferences from this vignette. First, how Starmer’s commitment to the improvement of democracy in line with Western-defined international legal norms may color his foreign policy approach (I believe this may have played a part in Labour’s recent calls for a ceasefire and a two-state solution on Israel-Palestine post-election). Second, that he recognizes – and even admires – the overall strength of Taiwan’s democracy and human rights record.
Finally, though the “China factor” is certainly not the sole determinant of the course of UK-Taiwan relations, we must acknowledge it tempers the diplomatic landscape for both sides. Starmer’s Labour has made its wariness towards China abundantly clear: “We will cooperate where we can compete where we need to, and challenge where we must.” In an unscripted statement, the foreign secretary also expressed concern over how China’s deepening partnerships with Russia and North Korea are playing out in Ukraine.
One might imagine that a cursory glance at UK-China relations under the previous Labour administration would prove instructive. Yet these statements from the new Labour government stand in contrast to the strategy developed by the Blair and Brown administrations from 1997-2010. The latter strategy explicitly sought to reap the benefits of China’s rapid economic growth at the turn of the century through increased trade and investment on the one hand while delegating the fundamental ethical flashpoints of Tibet and Taiwan to be handled through the position of the EU on the other. China’s investment in Europe and the UK has plummeted to significant lows, and the UK will probably follow the EU and US in imposing tariffs on Chinese electronic vehicles. These factors, coupled with Labour’s recent statements on China, dim the prospect of the new Labour government replicating the same level of economic cooperation with the PRC that was pursued under Blair and Brown.
In conclusion, I have presented an optimistic case for UK-Taiwan relations under the newly formed government. First, Labour shares a holistic view of security with domestic stability and prosperity as its preconditions, and I argue this “Securonomics” thinking resonates with the Taiwanese experience. Labour’s suggested policies, which include state regulation of generative AI to institutional coordination to counter the threat of anti-democratic ideologies, are all areas in which Taiwan would be well-placed to offer valuable technical insight and support. Second, the new administration’s refreshed security commitments to the EU and the US show Britain is likely to adopt similar stances toward Taiwan, China, and the Indo-Pacific as its key allies. Third, though Starmer is not the first Prime Minister to visit Taiwan in recent history, I believe his personal experiences visiting the country and speaking with Taiwanese officials are pertinent as they will likely inform his views on Taiwan and China moving forward. Finally, a cursory historical examination of UK-China relations under Blair and Brown already appears juxtaposed to the position of the current government, which is currently undergoing a 100-day audit of its relationship with China. Other events on the horizon may well change the landscape of UK-Taiwan relations, including the possibility of a meeting between Starmer and Xi Jinping at the upcoming G-20 summit in November.
Mariah Thornton is a PhD student at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Department of International Relations and a researcher at LSE IDEAS. Her research focuses on China’s foreign policy and strategy toward Taiwan, cross-strait relations, as well as Taiwan’s digital international relations. Before joining LSE, Mariah worked as a press and communications officer at the Taipei Representative Office for over two years under Taiwan’s then-representative to the UK and former foreign minister, David Y.L. Lin.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Taiwan-UK relations: continuity or change?’.
