Uncovering Cold War Liberalism in Taiwan’s History: An In-depth Analysis
Liberalism in Taiwan: A Cold War Heritage?
In recent years, the term Cold War liberalism has gained significant attention in academic and public discussions within the English-speaking world. Initially coined in the 1940s to criticize Communist sympathizers in the U.S., it now refers to Northern-Atlantic liberal thinkers active since the 1950s. In his book Liberalism Against Itself, Samuel Moyn identifies key figures such as Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper, whose critiques of Marxist totalitarianism have become central to liberal thought.
Critics like Moyn argue that Cold War liberals limited the visionary potential of liberalism. Their ideological battle against Marxism led them to believe that liberty should not be based on rigid moral doctrines. Although they supported social democracy, their stance prevented them from fully embracing collectivist egalitarianism, which they associated with the extreme politics of the Soviet Union. Instead, they advocated for an individualistic approach that prioritized safeguarding personal freedom from state interference.
This contemporary trend in scholarship raises an interesting question: was there Cold War liberalism in Taiwan? Although critics often view Cold War liberalism as specific to the Atlantic region, my study suggests that Taiwan’s relevance to this twentieth-century liberalism merits consideration. In this introductory article, I highlight the benefits of examining Taiwanese liberal thought through this new conceptual framework and explore how it can enhance our historical understanding.
Resemblances
Since the Kuomintang (K.M.T.) government relocated to Taiwan after 1949, the island has become crucial in the Western Bloc’s containment policy, promoting liberalism during the Cold War. Refugee intellectuals from mainland China, like Hu Shih, Lei Chen, and Yin Hai-Kuang, brought with them a strong enthusiasm for liberalism from their involvement in the May Fourth movement of 1919. They envisioned a Chinese utopia based on liberal democracy.
Since the Korean War in the 1950s, mainland liberals noticed Chiang Kai-Shek’s consolidation of power, creating a dictatorship similar to C.C.P. China. In response, they launched attacks on both the K.M.T. and C.C.P., advocating for a true liberal democracy in R.O.C. Taiwan. Learning from the K.M.T.’s civil war defeat, they criticized power centralization and corruption within the party, proposing reforms to ensure a Free China, safe from external communism and internal totalitarianism. These refugee intellectuals were instrumental in establishing key liberal initiatives in Taiwan, such as the Free China Journal and translating liberal canons into Mandarin.
Refugee liberals in Taiwan mirrored their Western counterparts in emphasizing individualism, opposing totalitarianism, and advocating for economic justice. Like prominent Western thinkers, Taiwan’s liberals are considered standard-bearers of contemporary liberal thought, particularly for those who witnessed Taiwan’s transition to liberal democracy in the 1980s. Figures like Yin Hai-Kuang and Lei Chen, who were suppressed by authorities in the 1960s, are seen as martyrs for liberal democracy. Their legacies, taught in textbooks, inspired a local passion for liberalism that fueled civil protests in the following decades.
Fantasy for a Genealogy
Moyn’s historiography reminds us that even revered Cold War liberals had flaws, and we should apply similar scrutiny to Taiwan’s refugee liberals. Using Cold War liberalism as a lens to examine these intellectuals is valuable. This doesn’t mean dismissing their contributions or seeing them as obstacles to better liberalism. Instead, we should explore the connection between the refugee liberal canons and our current understanding of liberal ideals in Taiwan.
The portrayal of Taiwan as an island of freedom has gained recognition, especially with the liberal international order facing challenges in the New Cold War between the U.S. and China. Many Taiwanese embrace the label “beacon for liberal democracy” in East Asia, given by Western observers. Locals are taught that this status is the result of a long struggle starting during Japanese colonization and continuing through the fight against the K.M.T. This narrative, linking efforts against the K.M.T. and China’s military threat to the present “Free Taiwan,” is familiar and largely true. However, it oversimplifies the development of liberalism in Taiwan as a single lineage of anti-authoritarianism and nationalism. This view is problematic, as it suggests the refugee intelligentsia’s political campaign in the 1950s marks the beginning of a tradition, which might not be accurate.
If we accept that refugee liberals in Taiwan were similar to Cold War liberals in the West, we must acknowledge that their liberal discourse was context-specific. Their approach to liberalism was deeply influenced by their backgrounds, driven by a patriotic focus on liberal democracy in China from their time on the mainland. These contexts shaped their understanding of liberalism’s meanings and objectives. However, our modern vision for liberal democracy arises from more diverse and complex backgrounds, making it important to question whether there was a genuine overlap between these contemporary contexts and the mainland experiences of refugee liberals. For instance, one of the most perceptible mismatches regards the perspectives on nationalism. Today, our justification for liberal democracy in Taiwan is heavily indebted to the traumatic memory of the 228 Massacre, which sustains the imagination of Taiwan as an island of freedom not merely in an institutional sense but also in our aspiration to rebuild Taiwan’s collective identity into one of solidarity and inclusiveness. Such an aspiration was, however, imaginably distant from the refugee intelligentsia. Can we, then, assume that the refugee intelligentsia represents the starting point of a liberal tradition, which includes branches of historical memory based on distinct political epistemologies, such as the latter massacre and tragedy?
Conclusion
The arguments of refugee liberals may resonate with us given that the old challenges of their time still linger in present-day Taiwan, and a genealogy that threads together then and now appears useful for understanding our predicament. Yet, the danger of a linear depiction of liberalism’s development in Taiwan lies in our tendency to compose a saga in which historical fragments are matched for harmony. While we may desire a saga for morale-boosting purposes, such a narrative may not be helpful in understanding the past of a Free Taiwan that led to its present and opened up its future. Employing Cold War liberalism as an analytical tool in the case of Taiwan serves to crystallize this point.
Thomas Liang-Chung Wang is a DPhil student majoring in intellectual history at the University of Oxford. His current research interest lies in British political thought in the twentieth century, focusing on the complexities of conservative historical consciousness during the Cold War era.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘SOAS Taiwan Studies Summer School’.